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Introduction
The rising defaults on subprime mortgages in the US
triggered a global crisis for the money markets. Many of
the world’s leading investment banks have collapsed as a
result and the US government has proposed a massive bail-
out. Similar observations can be made for the UK, Europe
and Asia. Other sectors of the economy are also suffering,
and the crisis has had a strong impact on the society at
large. The situation has become not only an economic but
also a societal challenge.
In this context, we are increasingly confronted with
issues which have effects beyond the borders of nation
states, and which include business as well as political and
societal institutions of all kinds. Such problems are called
‘‘wicked issues’’, because they involve many stakeholders
with different values and priorities, and cannot be solved
or even dominated by one institution or sector alone
(Camillus 2008). The current global financial crisis is such
a problem. It has become one of the most radical refor-
mations of the global banking sector ever, and it
fundamentally impacts our understanding of successful
governance systems.
None of the actors in the political or economic systems
seems particularly well coordinated, either within them-
selves or among each other. Hence, there is not any overall
scheme of coordinated governance. Therefore, no solution
that affects stakeholders satisfactorily regarding this issue
can be dismissed out of hand. The call for better gover-
nance systems also comes from experts in the financial
sector itself, as a letter from former hedge fund manager
Lahde (2008) demonstrates: ‘‘My suggestion is that […]
great minds […] come together [in a forum] to create a new
system of government […].’’ Establishing adequate gov-
ernance systems is still a long way away. However, it is
evident that neither the nation states nor private organiza-
tions such as corporations, NGOs and others will be able to
solve this wicked global problem on their own.
In accordance to the above, we will focus on what fol-
lows the deficient coordination and cooperation between
different governance approaches (political and economic)
from a stakeholder perspective. In this article, we are
aiming at extending ‘‘Stakeholderism’’ from the traditional
level of business to a new field, which we call ‘‘Stakeholder
Governance’’. We will reflect on how different stakehold-
ers can address wicked issues with a global scope, and what
the resulting demands on the governance systems are. The
focus is on global issues that are sufficiently far-reaching to
permeate different economic and political systems, and on
mutual value creation in relation to these issues. Therefore,
we see a need to explore the impact of organizational
networks such as stakeholder networks and the actors
involved at different levels. There is no consistent termi-
nology in the literature concerning multi-stakeholder
approaches (e.g., networked governance; multi-sectoral
networks). Our preferred term for the phenomenon is
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stakeholder network, from which we will begin to develop
the concept of stakeholder governance. In order to develop
an appropriate governance system for the situations
described above, we will first concentrate on the charac-
teristics of the current economic and the political gover-
nance systems.
Governance Systems from an Economic Perspective
Based on the thinking of Friedman (1970), the principles of
the market as coordinator and the belief in its problem
solving capacities seem to be omnipresent today (Freeman
et al. 2007, 2010). Therefore, the actors in the market claim
that self-regulation is the key to supplement free compe-
tition in the markets, as demonstrated by several types of
codes of conduct, created by themselves or business asso-
ciations (see e.g., King and Lenox 2000). None of these
codes includes any sanction mechanisms. With such codes
of self-regulation, corporations try to solve problems
regarding certain issues on their own, without involving
actors from other sectors, especially not influences from the
state. We are experiencing a time that is strongly influ-
enced by such an economic paradigm, and this paradigm is
increasingly being applied to all spheres of social life
(Freeman et al. 2007, 2010). From this perspective, our
main focus is on the firm and the firm’s governing system.
In the market-economic theory of the firm, different
streams of research have been developed, such as the
Principal Agency Theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen
and Meckling 1976), the transaction cost theory (see e.g.,
Coase 1937; Williamson 1989), or the property rights
theory (see e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Hart and
Moore 2000) to explain why firms exist and how firms
perform successfully (for an overview see e.g., Cyert and
March 1992; Foss 2000; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).
These theories have influenced the field of strategic man-
agement, and therefore also the understanding of corporate
governance. Blair and Stout (1999) call this the ‘‘Grand
Design of the Principal Agent Model’’, where the owner, in
a public corporation represented by the shareholders, is the
ultimate instance of control in the firm, due to the
assumption that the shareholders are the sole claimants of
residual risk.
In contrast to this traditional approach and from a
property rights perspective of the firm (e.g., Alchian and
Demsetz 1972; Asher et al. 2005; Blair 2005; Blair and
Stout 1999; Wang et al. 2009), scholars increasingly doubt
that the dominance of the owner is the most effective way
to understand strategic management. In the same vein,
Stout (2007, p. 9) writes: ‘‘Not too long ago, it was con-
ventional economic wisdom that the shareholders in a
corporation were the sole residual claimants in the firm,
meaning shareholders were entitled to all the ‘residual’
profits left over after the firm had met its fixed contractual
obligations to employees, customers, and creditors. This
assumption suggested that corporations were run best when
they were run for shareholders’ benefit alone, because if
other corporate stakeholders’ interests were fixed by their
contracts, maximizing the shareholders’ residual meant
maximizing the total social value of the firm. Time has
been unkind to this perspective. Advances in economic
thinking have made clear that shareholders generally are
not – and probably cannot be – sole residual claimants in
firms.’’ Blair and Stout (1999) also claim to have rethought
the ownership approach by focusing more on the impor-
tance of intellectual capital. In this perspective, the cor-
poration is only legitimized in its existence and only fulfills
its responsibilities, if it creates wealth for and with its
stakeholders. These arguments imply that corporate
responsibilities should integrate both wealth creation and
wealth dissemination (Phillips et al. 2003, p. 487):
‘‘Stakeholder theory is concerned with who has input in
decision making as well as with who benefits from the
outcome of such decisions.’’ This stakeholder perspective
challenges the understanding of traditional capitalism.
Property rights are not only attributed to shareholders but
also to owners of intellectual capital or more generally to
constituents making firm specific investments. In the same
vein, Stiglitz (2006, p. 203) proposes in his book on
globalization a reorientation of the firm’s role in society,
and that this could lead to better solutions of important
global issues: ‘‘One step in the right direction (note of the
author: to improve corporate governance) would be to have
companies take into account all stakeholders – employees
and the communities in which they operate, not just their
shareholders.’’ This is especially challenging for Multi-
National Corporations (MNC) that are active in different
societal settings. However, this new corporate role has
neither been thoroughly defined in regard to the state and
civil society, nor has it been legitimized through a demo-
cratic process (Matten and Crane 2005).
The essence of government in the economic system (see
Fig. 1 below) is, therefore, market regulation, sometimes
additionally disciplined by soft laws and corporate gover-
nance in a traditional ‘‘Grand Design’’ or a newly discussed
Stakeholder Model. On the basis of this frame of reference,
firms address global wicked issues.
Governance System from a Political Perspective
In contrast to the market mechanisms, the political system
is a strongly hierarchical system with a monopoly of power
by nation state governments, which have the possibility to
sanction due to regulations. Two important roles of
58 S. Sachs et al.
123
Western democracies are firstly, the protection of property
against illegal acquisition (through neutral judgements and
threat of sanctions) and secondly, providing public goods
(e.g., in the form of the welfare state). Most approaches in
the political sciences are state-centric. State actors and
institutions (e.g., parliament, government, public authori-
ties, policy programs) are the center of interest not only in
fields like comparative political science, but also interna-
tional relations where all kinds of relations between states
(e.g., balance of power, interdependence, installation of
regimes like WTO) are investigated and explained (see
e.g., Immergut 1992; Keohane and Nye 1977; Morgenthau
1948; Waltz 1979). Hence, nation state actors are seen as
the most relevant actors (see Fig. 1 below).
Today, however, a new and modern political science
view in international relations, such as the concept of
global governance, has given up this rigorous state-cent-
rism (see Abbott and Snidal 2009; Dingwerth and Pattberg
2006a, p. 187f., 2006b, p. 378f.; Messner and Nuescheler
2003; Rasche 2008; Reinicke 1997, p. 132). We have a
better understanding of a system of cooperative global
governance thanks to scholars (Abbott and Snidal 2009;
Benner et al. 2004; Bru¨tsch and Lehmkuhl 2007; Dingw-
erth and Pattberg 2006a; Held 2004; Reinicke 1997), who
question the strong dominance of governments of nation
states and intergovernmental organizations as the sole rel-
evant actors in regulation politics in transnational policy
fields. Rosenau (1995, p. 13) defines the term as follows:
‘‘Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule
at all levels of human activity – from the family to the
international organization – in which the pursuit of goals
through the exercise of control has transnational reper-
cussions.’’ Hence, the two main characteristics of the
concept are firstly, the relevance of different actors in
international relations, namely state and non-state actors;
and secondly, systems of rule from the local to the global
level. In relation to rules, a governance system can be
defined as ‘‘creating the conditions for ordered rule and
collective action’’ (Stoker 1998, p. 18).
In the global governance approach, all relevant actors
concerning an issue—including state actors, MNCs and
civil society—can similar to the modern theory of the firm
be seen as stakeholders (see e.g., Benedek 2006, p. 267,
2007; Benner et al. 2004, p. 194). To bring together all
relevant stakeholders, stakeholder networks are needed.
According to Kaul et al. (2003, p. 31) in recent years, the
policy agenda has lengthened and issues have become
more complex on the global level. Held (2004) proposes a
global issue network (GIN), i.e., a distinct global issue
network for each urgent policy problem (e.g., world health,
global economic regulation, energy) that brings together
the different stakeholders (see also Dingwerth and Pattberg
2006a, b, p. 383; Held 2004, p. 104ff.). According to Held
(2004) in an issue network, an affected stakeholder (e.g.,
neighborhood of a chemical industry) is brought together
with decision-maker stakeholders (e.g., management of
MNC), and hence both have a say in the assignation of this
issue. Thus, all relevant stakeholders would have a say in
providing a global public good (or in solving an issue) of
decisive importance for themselves (Held 2004, p. 79ff.;
Rondinelli 2002, p. 391ff.; Wolf 2000; 2003, p. 234ff.). In
an empirical study, Fransen and Kolk (2007) compare what
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they call multi-stakeholder standards to other collaborative
standards (these are drawn by single actors such as NGOs,
or International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such
as UN, WTO or by business associations) concerning the
dimensions of membership, governance and implementa-
tion. In their conclusion, they state that ‘‘multi-stakeholder
standards appear to have qualities that make them prefer-
able over other collaborative standards’’ (Fransen and Kolk
2007, p. 678). Cerny (2000), for example, emphasizes the
existence of diffuse and complex transnational webs of
governance. In his eyes, the formation of transnational
interest groups and the development of trans-governmental
coalitions are bringing different actors together into regular
networks, cutting across splintered states (Cerny 2000,
p. 173). Hence such networks cut across established
political and industrial borders. Also Midttun (2007)
advocates an arena of partnered governance between
political and economic areas due to the challenges of
global issues.
Benner et al. (2004, p. 193) note in summary: ‘‘New
forms of ‘networked governance’ at the intersection of the
public, private and not-for-profit sectors reflect the trans-
formation of governance in an increasingly interdependent
world.’’ ‘‘Networked governance’’ can create innovative
and flexible institutions which expand an organizational
vision.
What networked or stakeholder governance cannot do is
legislate. Such multi-sectoral or stakeholder networks and
new forms of public–private governance usually exist to
complement national policy-making and international
cooperation (Benner et al. 2004, 195ff.; Rasche 2009).
Even if some authors demand more coercive global gov-
ernance, stakeholder networks have no power to sanction
and hence their codes are at best ‘‘soft laws’’ (see e.g.,
Benedek 2006; Benner et al. 2004, p. 200; King and Lenox
2000). Thus, the main aim of such networks is to create a
qualified governance system in an area by bringing toge-
ther the relevant stakeholders.
An Initial Framework for Stakeholder Governance
Due to deficient coordination and cooperation between
different governance approaches, we advocate a ‘Stake-
holder View’ already mentioned briefly above. The starting
point of such a Stakeholder View is the corporation as an
economic and simultaneously societal institution embed-
ded in a broad range of stakeholders (Freeman et al. 2010,
e.g., Savage et al. 2008; Waddock et al. 2002). The
Stakeholder View as developed by Post et al. (2002)
emphasizes that the linkages between the corporation and
its multiple constituencies in the economic and societal
sphere are in many ways important vehicles for creating,
sustaining, and enhancing the corporation’s wealth-creat-
ing capacity.
If corporations want to tap their stakeholder network as
a source of corporate success, they need a system and a
procedure to build a common ground with their stake-
holders (see e.g., Freeman et al. 2007; Savage et al. 2008;
Windsor 2008). In this line of thinking, we understand
value creation with and for stakeholders as a mutual pro-
cess, which is not only understood in financial terms, but
encompasses a broader understanding of value, the content
of which needs to be defined among the parties involved.
These stakeholders are linked through networks (e.g.,
Frankforter and Hill 2008; Roloff 2008; Rowley 1997;
Savage et al. 2008). Stakeholder governance takes place
within the stakeholder network, in which the concrete
global issue to be solved is embedded. Therefore, the
stakeholder network seems the appropriate unit of analysis,
as it provides a promising starting point to conceptualize
research on global wicked issues and new governance
systems.
The normative core of the Stakeholder View, as devel-
oped in the context of the theory of the firm, is based on the
idea of property rights (see Post et al. 2002), as one of the
most important principles of our society (e.g., Alchian and
Demsetz 1972; Asher et al. 2005; Becker et al. 1978; Blair
1995, 2005; Blair and Stout 1999; Coase 1960). The
Stakeholder View of Strategy broadens the idea of property
rights not only to a financial view, but also to all those that
contribute (voluntarily or non-voluntarily) an issue-specific
investment, such as knowledge or cooperation in the
stakeholder network. This has in fact important implica-
tions for wealth creation and wealth distribution processes,
as well as for governance systems and control, by including
all stakeholders in the network that are either benefit
receivers or providers, as well as risk providers or bearers.
Based on our current research (Sachs et al. 2010,
2011b), we can say that the health care sector is interesting
for carrying out such research on stakeholder governance
beyond the level of the firm due to the current challenges
this sector faces, the many actors involved in the value
creation process and the interrelatedness of the relevant
stakeholders (Savage et al. 2004). The issues that the
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the different national
health care systems, are confronted with can be neither
resolved by the nation states nor by the corporations alone.
Stakeholders such as pharmacists, hospitals, government
authorities, professional associations, insurances, regula-
tors and patient advocacy groups are affecting the new
market structure and the political decision making pro-
cesses. These stakeholders are aiming to shift power and
the level of influence to the traditional stakeholder net-
works (see Lehtima¨ki and Kujala 2004; Schmitt 2007).
Top-down initiatives for such issues as for instance the
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‘‘European Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity
and Health’’ are often not very efficient, because from the
start they assemble all the possible stakeholders according
to the interests of the representative nation states and EU.
In such processes, stakeholders with impacts on value
creation are often neglected, according to our empirical
investigations (see Sachs et al. 2010, 2011b).
The global financial crisis has created similar problems.
As long as the globally interdependent financial markets
were running smoothly, calls for more coordination, reg-
ulation and control were moderate. Most stakeholders like
investors, regulators (e.g., government), mortgage takers,
financial corporations (e.g., banks, hedge funds) and their
employees, normal bank clients and a majority of the
public were generally content with the value creation in the
financial sector. After the previous economic crisis (dot-
com bubble), some measures, especially in the field of
corporate governance (e.g., codes of conduct; Sarbanes–
Oxley-Act), were established, namely concerning wealth
creation and distribution through shareholder value maxi-
mization. These measures mostly had to be understood in a
narrow sense of property rights.
The new financial crisis shows that despite such mea-
sures the issue of global financial markets and their
stakeholders still was not coordinated sufficiently, and
neither was the cooperation between the relevant actors. In
the course of the new crisis, many investors have lost their
money and employees their job. The demand and supply
situation in the ‘real economy’ with its many small and
medium-sized businesses has begun to worsen. Govern-
ments from various countries have had to attempt to con-
tain the crisis by spending billions of dollars. In the end,
with the financial involvement of the nation states in the
financial sector, the public and politicians have become one
of the very important stakeholders in the issue. Due to the
lack of adequate governance systems, what the former
value creation of the financial markets was for some has
become a loss of value for many, namely for whole
political economies around the globe. Nation state regula-
tory authorities, whose influence is restricted to state bor-
ders, were not in a position to anticipate and avert the
crisis. The meetings of heads of state at different financial
summits (e.g., G-20) after the outbreak of the crisis with
the aim of seeking internationally coordinated action have
only been partly successful. It is also questionable if
stronger codes of conduct imposed voluntarily by some of
the financial corporations will suffice (e.g., manager com-
pensation). None of these state and non-state actors is able
to solve such problems alone. Smaller countries are eco-
nomically too weak to save their financial MNCs several
times over (or even once), and the problem of coordination
isn’t solved by individually implemented corporate gov-
ernance models in single corporations. Furthermore, it is
not enough to strengthen inter-state-built IMF alone,
because here again the earlier mentioned problems of top-
down approaches will arise, as important stakeholders
could be neglected. The examples of the somewhat helpless
governance approaches in the financial crisis prove the
need for better frameworks for global governance (IMF
2008; New York Times 2008; Spiegel-Online 2008).
Therefore, we claim that the impacts of such issues have
to be negotiated from the perception of the different
stakeholders based on an enhanced understanding of
property rights. Especially those stakeholders who are
perceived as most important for the focal issue have firstly
to exchange perceptions with each other bilaterally. Then,
step-by-step, these discussions have to be coordinated and
aligned by a neutral independent authority such as mod-
eration accepted by the involved parties. In this process,
there may be a need to include additional stakeholders. In
this way, networks for stakeholder governance concerning
certain issues can be established.
The following framework (Fig. 1) summaries and
emphasizes the contribution of stakeholder governance for
global wicked issues:
Challenges of Stakeholder Governance
One of the main challenges of a governance system based
on stakeholder networks is not only bringing in all relevant
groups and being effective, but is legitimacy. Such net-
works are mostly horizontal and deliberative, and are
therefore fundamentally different from democracies in a
parliamentary sense, where every citizen has at least a vote
in the political process (Wolf 2000, 2003, p. 234ff.). In a
democratic state, the political agency which gets the
majority of votes comes to power legitimately. Such
‘vertical’ or input legitimacy is very difficult to achieve for
the representatives of a global issue-network, in which state
and non-state actors participate (Benner et al. 2004,
p. 192ff.; Cerny 2000, p. 181).
It is also salient in a stakeholder governance system to
clarify the similarities and differences of the term ‘‘citizen’’
in relation to ‘‘stakeholder.’’ ‘‘Citizen’’ considers the
membership of an individual to a nation state, where he or
she has rights (e.g., a vote) and duties (e.g., paying taxes).
Stakeholders are usually seen as actors in the role either as
benefit receivers/providers or risk bearers/providers toward
a firm or toward an issue. The global governance approach
thinks of an issue at a network’s center, while the stake-
holder approach normally thinks of a corporation at the
network’s center (see e.g., Roloff 2008). Stakeholders may
be individuals, communities, organizations or communities
(Held 2004, p. 99; Keohane 2002, p. 14ff.). Contrary to the
citizen, a stakeholder usually has not the right to participate
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in a democratic decision making process, even if he is
strongly affected by an issue or an action. The stake-
holder’s role in a network to solve wicked global issues
differs from the citizen’s role in a national state.
An interesting development concerning citizenship and
democracy that is flourishing in the area of stakeholder
research of firms is the idea of stakeholder democracy.
Different streams, most of them influenced by the discourse
on ‘corporate citizenship’, can be singled out. One stream
focuses on the discussion of the firm as a global player and
thus also a potential owner of global issues. Firms are
understood as citizens who have rights and responsibilities
toward the community and other stakeholders (Crane et al.
2004; Rondinelli 2002; Waddock and Smith 2000).
Another stream stresses primarily the processes of partic-
ipation on two different levels. On the firm or corporate
governance level, the question is how stakeholders are
integrated in the managerial decision making process (De
Jong and Van Witteloostuijn 2004, e.g., Harrison and
Freeman 2004; critical: Kerr 2004; Matten and Crane
2005). On the macro level, questions about corporations
participating in governance processes are raised (Palazzo
and Scherer 2006; Thompson and Driver 2005). Thus,
several authors (e.g., Ba¨ckstrand 2006; Bendell 2005;
Kaler 2002; Matten and Crane 2005) at different levels
critically discuss the governance systems of stakeholder
democracy. These insights contribute to the specificities of
a stakeholder governance system.
Avenues of Further Research
In the emerging ‘‘Stakeholder Governance’’ research, the
following areas can be identified as important:
• A multi-level approach seems appropriate for research
into governance systems in relation to global wicked
issues. We claim that a bottom-up approach would be a
more effective procedure in contrast to a top-down
approach (see e.g., Habermas 2008 [for the contrary
position]; Windsor 2007). This procedure would more
easily allow for identifying other newly emerging
governance systems.
• There is also a need to elaborate how the process of
mutual value creation is defined by the stakeholders
involved (Sachs et al., 2011a). Does mutual value
creation have to consider both the public and private
good (for this discussion see Freeman et al. 2010;
Freeman et al. 2007; Held 2004; Kaul et al. 2003;
Rondinelli 2002)?
• A reflection on the process of legitimation (as already
hinted above) has to take place, namely how do each of
the parties involved receive a legitimate status or not by
taking into account both democratic and market
principles (see e.g., Bendell 2005; Benner et al. 2004;
Wolf 2000, 2003). Aligned with this question is a
readjusted understanding of the roles of the corporation
(Matten and Crane 2005; Post et al. 2002) and the
nation state in a modern society (Held 2004).
• There is also the possibility for empirical research (e.g.,
comparative case analysis) of successful and unsuc-
cessful examples of governance systems tackling
wicked issues with global scope.
• Finally, we have to think about whether stakeholder
theory has the potential of a meta theory, similar to the
claim of biological evolutionary theory by some
scholars, based on the application of principles of
evolutionary thinking to social or economic science
(see e.g., Dawkins 1986; Wilson 1998).
References
Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2009). The governance triangle:
Regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the state. In
W. Mattli & N. Woods (Eds.), The politics of global regulation
(pp. 44–88). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs,
and economic organization. The American Economic Review,
62(5), 777–795.
Asher, C. C., Mahoney, J. M., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005). Towards a
property rights foundation for a stakeholder theory of the firm.
Journal of Management and Governance, 9(1), 5–32.
Ba¨ckstrand, K. (2006). Democratizing global environmental gover-
nance? Stakeholder democracy after the world summit on
sustainable development. European Journal of International
Relations, 12(4), 467–498.
Becker, R., Mackenthun, M., & Mu¨ller, R. (1978). Controlling. In G.
Kienbaum (Ed.), Strategische Unternehmungsfu¨hrung pp. Mu¨n-
chen: Verlag Moderne Industrie.
Bendell, J. (2005). In whose name? The accountability of corporate social
responsibility. Development in Practice, 15(3&4), 362–374.
Benedek, W. (2006). Global Governance der Weltwirtschaft. In P.
Koller (Ed.), Die globale Frage: Empirische Befunde und
ethische Herausforderungen (pp. 257–274). Wien: Passen
Verlag.
Benedek, W. (2007). The emerging global civil society: Achieve-
ments and prospects. In V. Rittberger & M. Nettesheim (Eds.),
Changing patterns of authority in the global political economy,
Vol. II: New actors and forms of regulation (pp. 170–185).
Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers.
Benner, T., Reinicke, W. H., & Witte, J. M. (2004). Multisectoral
networks in global governance: Towards a pluralistic system of
accountability. Government and Opposition, 39(2), 191–210.
Blair, M. (1995). Ownership and control. Washington: The Brookings
Institute.
Blair, M. (2005). Closing the theory gap: How the economic theory of
property rights can help bring ‘‘stakeholders’’ back into theories
of the firm. Journal of Management and Governance, 9(1),
33–39.
Blair, M. M., & Stout, L. A. (1999). A team production theory of
corporate law. Virginia Law Review, 85(2), 247–328.
62 S. Sachs et al.
123
Bru¨tsch, C., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2007). Law and legalization in
transnational relations. In C. Bru¨tsch & D. Lehmkuhl (Eds.),
Complex legalization and the many moves to law (pp. 9–32).
London: Routledge.
Camillus, J. C. (2008). Strategy as a wicked problem. Harvard
Business Review, 86, 99–106.
Cerny, P. G. (2000). Globalization and the disarticulation of political
power: Towards a new middle ages? In H. Goverde, P. G. Cerny,
M. Haugaard, & H. H. Lentner (Eds.), Power in contemporary
politics (pp. 170–186). London: Sage Publications.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. In O. E. Williamson & S.
G. Winter (Eds.), The nature of the firm—oigins evolution and
development (pp. 18–33). New York: Oxford University Press.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and
Economics, 3, 1–44.
Crane, A., Matten, D., & Moon, J. (2004). Stakeholders as citizens?
Rethinking rights, participation, and democracy. Journal of
Business Ethics, 53, 107–122.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1992). A behavioral theory of the firm.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker—why the evidence of
evolution reveals a universe without design. Bath: Norton Press.
De Jong, G., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2004). Successful corporate
democracy: Sustainable cooperation of capital and labor in the
Dutch Breman Group. Academy of Management Executive,
18(3), 54–66.
Dingwerth, K., & Pattberg, P. (2006a). Global governance as a
perspective on world politics. Global Governance, 12(2),
185–203.
Dingwerth, K., & Pattberg, P. (2006b). Was is it global governance?
Leviathan, 34(3), 377–399.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and
control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301–325.
Foss, N. J. (2000). The theory of the firm: An introduction to themes
and contributions. In N. J. Foss (Ed.), The Theory of the Firm
(pp. xi–lxi). London: Routledge.
Frankforter, S. A. & Hill, V. (2008). A model of stakeholder networks:
Qualities, relationship and structure. Paper presented at Acad-
emy of Management Annual Meeting.
Fransen, L., & Kolk, A. (2007). Global rule-setting for business: A
critical analysis of multi-stakeholder standards. Organization,
14(5), 667–684.
Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., Wicks, A. C., Parmar, B. L., & De
Colle, S. (2010). Stakeholder theory: The state of the art.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, R. E., Martin, K., & Parmar, B. (2007). Stakeholder
capitalism. Journal of Business Ethics, 74, 303–314.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits. New York Times Magazine, 32–33, 122–126.
Habermas, J. (2008). Ach, Europa. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag.
Harrison, J. S., & Freeman, R. E. (2004). Special topic: Democracy in
and around organizations. Is organizational democracy worth the
effort? Academy of Management Executive, 18(3), 49–53.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (2000). Property rights and the nature of the
firm. In N. J. Foss (Ed.), Theory of the firm (pp. 90–127).
London: Routledge.
Held, D. (2004). Global covenant. Cambridge: Polity Press.
IMF. (2008). World leaders launch action plan to combat financial
Crisis. IMF Survey Magazine. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/survey/so/2008/new111508a.htm].
Immergut, E. (1992). The rules of the game: The logic of health
policy-making in France, Switzerland and Sweden. In S.
Steinmo, K. Thelen, & F. Longstreth (Eds.), Structuring politics.
Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis (pp. 57–89).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm—
managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure.
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Kaler, J. (2002). Responsibility, accountability and governance.
Business Ethics: A European Review, 11(4), 327–334.
Kaul, I., Pedro, C., Le Goulven, K., & Mendoza, R. U. (2003).
Providing global public goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). Global governance and democratic account-
ability. Miliband Lectures. London: London School of Economics.
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and interdependence:
World politics in transition. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
Kerr, J. L. (2004). The limits of organizational democracy. Academy
of Management Executive, 18(3), 81–95.
King, A. A., & Lenox, M. J. (2000). Industry self-regulation without
sanctions: The chemical industry’s responsibility care program.
The Academy of Management Journal, 43(4), 698–716.
Lahde, A. (2008). Goodbye…and think pot. Goodbye Letter.
CNBC.COM.
Lehtima¨ki, H., & J. Kujala. (2004). Strategising in multi-voiced
business settings. Paper presented at EBRF 2004 conference
Research Forum to Understand Business in Knowledge Society,
Tampere, Finland, September 2004.
Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005). What is stakeholder democracy?
Perspectives and issues. Business Ethics: A European Review,
14(1), 6–13.
Messner, D., & Nuescheler, F. (2003). Das Konzept Global Gover-
nance—Stand und Perspektiven. INEF Report 67, Duisburg,
pp. 1–52.
Midttun, A. (2007). Corporate (social) responsibility as an arena for
partnered governance: From the business to the public policy
case. Paper presented at the EABIS annual colloquium, Barce-
lona, Spain, September 2007.
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, organization and
management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among nations. Boston: McGraw
Hill.
New York Times. (2008). Credit crisis—the essentials. New York:
The New York Times.
Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. G. (2006). Corporate legitimacy as
deliberation: A communicative framework. Journal of Business
Ethics, 66(1), 71–88.
Phillips, R., Freeman, R. E., & Wicks, A. C. (2003). What stakeholder
theory is not. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4), 479–502.
Post, J. E., Preston, L. E., & Sachs, S. (2002). Redefining the
corporation: Stakeholder management and organizational
wealth. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Rasche, A. (2008). In search of global governance—the contribution
of the United Nations Global Compact. Paper presented at the
Academy of Management (AoM) annual meeting, Anaheim, CA,
August 2008.
Rasche, A. (2009). A necessary supplement: What the United Nations
global compact is and is not. Business & Society. doi:
10.1177/0007650309332378).
Reinicke, W. H. (1997). Global public policy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6),
127–138.
Roloff, J. (2008). Learning from multi-stakeholder networks: Issue-
focussed stakeholder management. Journal of Business Ethics,
82(1), 233–250.
Rondinelli, D. A. (2002). Transnational corporations: International
citizens or new sovereigns. Business & Society Review, 107(4),
391–413.
Rosenau, J. N. (1995). Governance in the twenty-first century. Global
Governance, 1, 13–43.
Rowley, T. J. (1997). Moving beyond dyadic ties—A network theory
of stakeholder influences. Academy of Management Review,
22(4), 887–910.
Stakeholder Governance as a Response to Wicked Issues 63
123
Sachs, S., Groth, H., & Schmitt, R. (2010). The ‘stakeholder view’
approach: An untapped opportunity to manage corporate
performance and wealth. Strategic Change, 19(3–4), 147–162.
Sachs, S., Ru¨hli, E., & Kern. I. (2011a). Stakeholders matter. London:
Cambridge University Press.
Sachs, S., Schmitt, R., & Perrin, I. (2011b). Stakeholder value
creation system. Cambridge: Politeia.
Savage, G. T., Bunn, M. D., Gray, B., Xiao, Q. & Wang, S. (2008).
Stakeholder collaboration: Implications for stakeholder theory
and practice. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Association for Business and Society (IABS),
Tampere, Finland, June 2008.
Savage, G. T., Dunkin, J. W., & Ford, D. M. (2004). Responding to a
crisis: A stakeholder analysis of community health organiza-
tions. Journal of Health and Human Services Administration
(JHHSA), 26(4), 383–414.
Schmitt, R. (2007). Dealing with an open stakeholder society: An
investigation into the Camisea case. Bern: Haupt.
Spiegel-Online. (2008). Summit on financial markets and the world
economy—full text of declaration. Spiegel Online International.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,590885,00.
html.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2006). Making globalization work: The next steps to
global justice. New York: Norton.
Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: Five propositions. Interna-
tional Social Science Journal, 155, 17–28.
Stout, L. A. (2007). Why we should stop teaching. Dodge vs.
Ford. UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No.
07-11.
Thompson, G., & Driver, C. (2005). Stakeholder champions: How to
internationalize the corporate social responsibility agenda.
Business Ethics: A European Review, 14(1), 56–66.
Waddock, S., Bodwell, C., & Graves, S. B. (2002). Responsibility:
The new business imperative. Academy of Management Exec-
utive, 16(2), 132–148.
Waddock, S., & Smith, N. (2000). Relationships: The real challenge
of corporate global citizenship. Business & Society Review,
105(1), 47–62.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York:
Random House.
Wang, H. C., He, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2009). Firm-specific
knowledge resources and competitive advantage: The roles of
economic- and relationship-based employee governance mech-
anisms. Strategic Management Journal, 30(12), 1265–1285.
Williamson, O. E. (1989). Transaction cost economics. In R.
Schmalensee & R. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of industrial
organization (pp. 135–182). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience—the unity of knowledge. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Windsor, D. (2007). Towarda global theory of cross-borderand multilevel
corporate political activity. Business & Society, 46, 253–278.
Windsor, D. (2008). Stakeholder dynamics. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the International Association for Business and
Society (IABS), Tampere, Finland, June 2008.
Wolf, K. D. (2000). The new raison D’E´tat: International cooperation
against societies? In M. Albert, L. Brock, & K. D. Wolf (Eds.),
Civilizing world: Society and community beyond the state (pp.
119–132). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolf, K. D. (2003). Normsetzung in internationalen Institutionen
unter Mitwirkung privater Akteure? International Environmental
Governance zwischen ILO, o¨ffentlich-privaten Politiknetzwer-
ken und Global Compact. In S. Von Schorlemer (Ed.), Praxis-
handbuch UNO: die Vereinten Nationen im Lichte globaler
Herausforderungen (pp. 225–240). Berlin: Springer.
64 S. Sachs et al.
123
